

TOP SECRET SENSITIVE

2 December 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Morning Meeting of 2 December 1969

ADD/I briefed on the good coverage of last week's SR-71 mission over North Korea.

ADD/I called attention to a recently completed Memorandum on the apparent shifts in North Korean tactics along the DMZ and went on to say that this piece will be distributed in the OCI Weekly Review.

25X1 Godfrey noted [] that Ambassador Lodge's replacement in Paris may be named soon.

D/ONE described a long Board meeting which dealt with whether to develop a Memorandum to Holders of the latest Estimate on Soviet CBW. He went on to explain that, if such a Memorandum were prepared, about all we would wish to update would be the estimated tonnage of stockpiled CBW. After some discussion the Director noted his view that such a Memorandum is not warranted []

25X1 []
D/ONE noted that, with the exception of NSA, all the work on NIE 11-14 appears to be completed. The Director indicated that NSA should take a footnote if it is unable to clarify its position in the near future.

*Maury reported that George Murphy, staff member of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, has requested a briefing by or session with the Director on the SALT negotiations. After some discussion the Director asked that Mr. Murphy be advised information pertaining to SALT must be obtained from either the President or ACDA.

Maury noted that our retirement legislation passed the House yesterday and may be considered by the Senate Armed Services Committee on 4 December, at which time the Director may be called upon

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to appear. In response to the Director's question DDCI noted that briefing material on this matter is in hand, and the Director indicated that he, DDCI, or the Executive Director should be prepared to brief. Maury closed by noting that he will be in touch with Ed Braswell to determine whether our presence is desired..

Maury reported that he was in touch with Senator John Sherman Cooper in an effort to arrange an appointment with the Director to discuss the problem of Bill Miller's access to certain kinds of materials.

The Director called Maury's attention to the Congressional Record of 21 November, in which Senator Fulbright indicates that some of the Director's past testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee can be made available to senators to read in his office but is not otherwise available to staff assistants. Maury noted that he has read this material. (attached).

Bross called attention to a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense from Robert Froehlke indicating what portions of the intelligence budget might be cut and in what amount. Bross noted that he thinks Froehlke's position is reasonable.

25X1 Bross called attention to a letter from John J. McCloy praising [] presentation to ACDA's General Advisory Committee on 25 November. The Director noted that he too has seen the letter.

25X1 DD/S&T briefed on difficulties encountered in obtaining the necessary telemetry on a recent Soviet SS-9 shot and described the problem as possibly being no radar at the other end.

DDCI commented that he will be at the Naval War College tomorrow and will return about 1530.

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Goodwin noted that Tom Lambert's piece on Vietnam has appeared in the Boston Globe and elsewhere.

Goodwin commented that the College Poll, which appeared in the Rutgers Daily Targum, has now appeared elsewhere.

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L. K. White

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*Extracted and sent to action officer

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good, long memory. I remember what the Russians did to keep their promises about our having access to Berlin.

I remember what the Russians did about their promises about nuclear explosions in outer space.

I remember what Gromyko said to our late beloved President John F. Kennedy at the time of the Cuban missile crisis.

For us to take a position of refusing an authorization in an important matter which affects this most critical confrontation between our President and the Russians—a position which would leave him in the situation of not being able to say that his Congress stands back of him—and for me to cast a vote of that kind, I am not about to do it.

I am certainly going to vote for this particular authorization project, in its beginning stage just now procedurally, so that the President will not find the ground cut out from under him as he enters into this important confrontation with the Russians.

I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield 1 minute to the distinguished Senator from Wyoming.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Wyoming is recognized for 1 minute.

Mr. HANSEN. Mr. President, the senior Senator from Washington has made a very fine contribution here this afternoon. I am not a technician or a scientist. But what the Senator has said makes good sense to me.

It seems to me that he has clarified what the Russian intention is. I know that there is a great debate going on as to whether this is the perfect system.

My distinguished colleague, the Senator from Illinois, pointed out the difficulty with the M-16 rifles and Norad.

I ask my distinguished colleague, the Senator from Illinois, who won World War II?

I join the distinguished Senator from Washington in the belief that we should take all the steps we can take now on the basis of our best judgment to protect the security of our country.

Mr. JACKSON. Mr. President, I yield the floor.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Mr. President, just for the information of Senators, I propose to read a few excerpts from the classified hearings before my committee. Primarily about 90 percent of it is expressions of statements by the CIA Director, Mr. Helms.

The reason why I do it is that a number of Senators are not members of the committee. It would be more troublesome to go to the room and read it there. However, the record will be available to read there if Senators desire.

Mr. STEVENS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. STEVENS. The Senator mentioned the bits of classified testimony before the two committees. Are they available to us at any time?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They are available only to those Senators who go to the room and personally read them. They are not available to assistants. Senators cannot send for the records.

That is why I said it would be more convenient to have it read now. If a Senator personally goes to the director of our staff and asks for it, he will make them available to the Senator personally. However, the Senator cannot take them out of the room. He can read them there. That is a rule of the committee for preserving the classification of this kind of document.

That is the reason that I presume to take the time of the Senate to read some of them.

These are fairly recent, although they were not as of yesterday.

The one item the Senator mentioned on the SS-9's is something on which we had the same figure as that given by the Senator from Washington. We had it 2 weeks ago.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I will yield in a moment.

The Senator called attention to the fact that this is the first time the Senate has ever discussed the weapons system. I think he is quite correct. For that reason, I congratulate the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator from Missouri for precipitating it.

I think one of the great problems that has arisen in recent years has been the proliferation of weapons systems in the Pentagon which have proved to be ineffectual. This has been written up at length. I think, as one Senator that the Senate has neglected to inquire into these matters in the past and that if we had engaged in a discussion in the past such as we have had recently, and done so more often, it might have saved the country \$10 billion or \$20 billion. Whatever the outcome, I think it is a very worthwhile operation.

I think it is one that the Senate ought to engage in every year. I refer to subjecting the Pentagon requests for money to scrutiny.

I have never seen it before. I have been here in Congress for 27 years. I have been in the Senate for 25 years.

Many times appropriation bills, requests, and authorizations for amounts of from \$10 billion to \$50 billion have been submitted to the Senate, and a very perfunctory statement has been made about them. There has been literally no debate, but only a few congratulatory statements about what a fine job had been done. Usually the votes on some bills in the past have been unanimous. Perhaps two or three people voted against them. We used to have one maverick who used to vote against them as a matter of principle.

I do not believe that I ever voted against one in my life. I rarely read one. I rarely tried to cut one. It was utterly unthinkable that one would succeed.

Whatever else might have happened, under the leadership of the Senator from Tennessee and the Senator from Missouri, I think that the Senate has made great progress in undertaking to discuss a problem which is a very important one.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield first to the Senator from Tennessee.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The Senator from Tennessee is recognized.

Mr. GORE. Mr. President, I do not know whether we will have another closed session tomorrow. Because of the death of a relative, I cannot be present tomorrow.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The Senator from Missouri said not. He said he would ask for one later. There will be an open session tomorrow.

Mr. GORE. I rise to point out that with reference to the so-called overnight information about the number of SS-9's, if one comes to the chairman's desk, he will see that Mr. Helms gave us this testimony on June 23. Let me make sure of the date. Yes, it was in June.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. June 23.

Mr. GORE. June 23.

I want to advert to one other thing. I was really astounded to hear the junior Senator from Washington and the Senator from Texas refer to the Russians' intention of going for a first-strike capability. It seemed to impress the able junior Senator from Wyoming, because he said that now the Senator from Washington has clarified the Soviet intentions.

Well, Mr. President, Secretary Laird based his whole case, in his first testimony, on an assertion, to quote him, that the Soviets are going for a first-strike capability; there is no question about that. Well, we found there was a great deal of question about it; and if Senators will come to the desk and read, they will find that the National Intelligence Board did not support that conclusion and the CIA does not support that conclusion. The committee heard no such estimate of the Russians' intentions from anyone else.

Therefore, it comes somewhat as a surprise that it is asserted on the floor of the Senate, after Secretary Laird backed away from that. We spent a whole day examining this question. He backed completely away from that justification of ABM.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I would say that is correct. The Senator from Tennessee developed it, and it is in the record.

What Secretary Laird finally came to, it seemed to me, was that the SS-9 itself was the kind of weapon that could be used to destroy other weapons and in that sense perform part of the function of a first strike weapon. But he did not mean they were going for a first strike capability. I think that is a fair interpretation of what he said.

I yield to the Senator from Mississippi.

Mr. STENNIS. I thank the Senator for yielding.

Mr. President, I should like to comment briefly upon the inferences about information that might be available to some and not to others. I get my information by digging hard and getting into those estimates and comparing and trying to find what I want, and getting the assistance of people who write it up. It is a long, hard chore.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. It is.

Mr. STENNIS. I do not have an advantage over any other Senator, even though I am chairman of the committee.

I say to the Senator from Arkansas that many appropriation and authoriza-

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tion bills for the military have come to the floor of the Senate which already had quite large reductions. I recall that one year over \$1 billion was taken out of an appropriation bill.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On the floor?

Mr. STENNIS. No, by the committee.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I was talking about on the floor.

Mr. STENNIS. A good deal has been said about just nodding one's head and giving the Pentagon what they wanted. But that is over a period of years.

The bill to which I referred was a big bill, handled by the Senator from Georgia. I handled the military construction.

I have just decided that I should bring this up about reductions. For approximately 10 years, and every year except one, we showed reductions of from 5 to 10, 15, 20, and 22 percent. I am satisfied that we did not hurt the bone and muscle. But my point is that we went over everything.

A few years ago, I handled the appropriation bill for the Department of Defense and complained on the floor of the Senate because not enough money was in it. I knew that not enough money was in it, because a war was going on. They had not asked for enough. I said so here, and I asked them to send in some real estimates so that we could be more realistic. They did not send them in, and in January we had a deficit of \$12.6 billion because of the war.

That is a kind of two-way street and a two-sided matter. My point is that the committees have tried to cope with these things.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I think the Senator, in all fairness, misunderstood what I said. I certainly did not say the committee had never dealt with these. I was talking about on the floor of the Senate. It is the first time we have had a debate on a missile system.

I think the record will show that is what I said. I was not criticizing the Senator from Mississippi, and every word he has said is true. I do say that on the floor of the Senate I cannot recall a serious debate about a military appropriation or authorization, and I do not recall any serious cuts ever having been proposed and put into effect on the floor of the Senate.

I am not on the committee, and obviously I was not talking about the Senator's committee.

Mr. STENNIS. I welcome debate.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I certainly did not mean to criticize the Senator from Mississippi and his committee. I was talking about my own function as a Senator and not a member of the Senator's committee.

I have never really seriously debated nor considered nor had anything to do with a matter similar to the one we are debating today. I think the Senator will agree with that, and I do not think he can recall any comparable debate on any item in an authorization or appropriation bill for the Military Establishment.

Mr. President, I should like to read a few relatively short excerpts from some of these hearings. I have tried to pick out some of them that are pertinent to the debate.

I point out that the record I hold in

my hand was taken on June 23, which was not very long ago, with Director Helms and Mr. Laird. It contains 235 pages, so obviously I cannot read it all.

On the matter of the SS-9, which has occupied so much time here today, I am not sure it is all that important, but I do this just for the record. I will make a few citations. On page 62, I read a quotation from the testimony of Mr. Helms, and I shall only read those areas which I think are especially pertinent:

(Deleted.)

This is what I meant—what the Senator from Tennessee mentioned a moment ago.

(Deleted.)

I submit that these are exactly the same figures the Senator from Washington gave, and they are not new in the sense that they discovered it yesterday, because this was said on June 23.

Mr. DOMINICK. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. I yield.

Mr. DOMINICK. I think that what the Senator from Washington said—and I thought the inference was plain—was that when the Safeguard system was decided upon, it was done on the basis that the intelligence in 1967 and 1968 as to the number of Soviet ICM's estimate had shown less than the (deleted) in place or under construction as of the first of the year, when the new administration came in. They found out that instead of leveling off at 250, which had been expected, it had gone up to (deleted), which indicated that the Soviets were going to go forward with their production instead of leveling off as had been originally estimated last November.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. The only difference between June 23 and the previous meeting with Mr. Helms, which was—it was (deleted). That was in the previous meeting. In the interrogatory of May 7, he had, in 1969, one (deleted) known to have been started so far.

Since that time he added these (deleted) new groups, which I just read.

Mr. DOMINICK. (Deleted) new groups?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. Yes. I am just trying to straighten this out. This is not my opinion. I am only trying to put this in the record.

Mr. DOMINICK. I understand.

Mr. FULBRIGHT. On page 65 of this same record Mr. Helms, talking about MIRV or MRV, said:

The intelligence community—

This is the community because the CIA is the chairman of that community—

(Deleted.)

This is what surprised me:

(Deleted.)

In other words what he said is that if they put three in it, it will not be as reliable as with one. The implication is clear. There is nothing to fear from having three instead of one.

(Deleted.)

He is saying that the Pentagon says it is deliberate and the community does not. That is one of the differences that occurred. Much was said in the press

about the differences without specifying what it was.

Then, on page 102, this has to do with the PAR radar. There has been some apparent difference also on some of these other reports. This is Mr. Laird and this is the meeting when Mr. Laird and Mr. Helms appeared before the committee. I am reading from page 102 of the same record:

Secretary LAIRD. MSR, is in place and has been constructed at Kwajalein. A PAR radar has never been constructed at any site, but the components have all been tested, and I am confident it will work.

Secretary Laird testified on page 103:

We have not built the computer. The computer is within the state of the art, however.

Then, on page 201 the following appears. I am not reading all of these because of the time. I might use them later if we get into another session when there is more time, but the hour is late. This is on page 202 and this was when we were discussing the question of the finding with regard to Soviet capability for a first strike. Secretary Laird said:

The answer is it has not been considered. The CHAIRMAN. The answer is, no, they have made no such findings.

Senator GORE. All right.

Has the National Intelligence Board made a finding that the Soviets are going for a first strike capability with any other meaning of that term in mind?

Mr. HELMS. (Deleted.)

The only reason I cite that is on the specific question that the Defense Intelligence Agency and the intelligence community never made a finding that they are going for first strike capability.

Mr. DOMINICK. Is the Senator distinguishing between capability and intent?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. They made no finding of intent and they made no finding they are going for capability.

Mr. DOMINICK. There is a distinction?

Mr. FULBRIGHT. There are a great many pages on that. The Senator from Tennessee (Mr. GORE) examined Mr. Laird for an hour or longer on this point. I am trying to give the Senator the final answer. If the Senator wishes to pursue it, he may. The point about what is meant by capability and intent is developed at length.

Secretary Laird, at page 203, said:

The Defense Intelligence Agency—

He is talking about the Defense Intelligence Agency. That is distinct from the Defense Intelligence Board, of which Mr. Helms is chairman. I continue to read:

Secretary LAIRD. The Defense Intelligence Agency, and I want to choose my words very carefully, their experts do believe that (deleted) is used on the SS-9 has the capability (deleted).

There is this difference of attitude. That happens in the question of the SS-9 and also on capability. There are some other matters at page 229 of the record. This deals with the SS-9.

Secretary LAIRD. Well, the present number of sites under construction and in being of SS-9's goes above the high estimate as far as 1971; isn't that about it?

Mr. HELMS. (Deleted.)

The CHAIRMAN. Is that the only significant difference?

NEWSWEEK

THE PERISCOPE

CIA: ANOTHER GREEN BERETS CASE?

The Central Intelligence Agency faces yet another Green Berets case that threatens unwelcome publicity about details of its clandestine operations. The new case concerns former Green Beret Capt. John McCarthy of Phoenix, Ariz., who has been serving a twenty-year term for the murder of a Cambodian interpreter in Saigon two years ago. McCarthy's attorney, Charles Morgan of Atlanta, is demanding a public trial for the ex-captain, arguing that, although McCarthy was technically on military duty, the slaying occurred while he was living "as a civilian ... under the direct control of a civilian agency of the United States Government." McCarthy has been provisionally freed pending a decision.